1997 Anthony P. Tully
MYSTERIES OF THE IMPERIAL
JAPANESE NAVY
Death of Battleship HIEI: Sunk
by Gunfire or Air Attack?
Among
naval historians and enthusiasts
there are few naval battles of
World War II that provoke
as much controversy and
fascinating reconstructions as
the savage night battle known as
`Friday the 13th'and the `First
Naval Battle of Guadalcanal ' to
the Allies, and the "Third
Battle of The Solomon Sea" to
the Japanese. This action, which
took place after the midnight
hour of 12/13 November 1942, was
itself part of an unfolding
battle that lasted four days.
However, it is the night action
of the 13th and what happened to
the survivors in the day that
followed, that appears to
provoke the most interest. The
reasons are not hard to
discover.
The
Japanese battleship HIEI, and
the American cruisers
ATLANTA and
JUNEAU (of the five
ill-fated "Sullivan's brothers"
renown) are among the famous
ships that went down that night.
In the years since, each sinking
has raised its own set of
questions and debates. Those
surrounding HIEI concern her
condition after the gunfire
phase had ended; Namely, was
HIEI already a doomed total
loss, perhaps foundering
already, when hit by air attack
off Savo Island the following
day? As recently as summer of
1992 a major undersea expedition
led by the renowned Dr.
Robert Ballard explored
many of the celebrated wrecks.
However, the mighty HIEI appears
to have eluded discovery. In
burial site - as in dying - the
HIEI wears a tantalizing cloak
of ambiguity. This article
endeavors to lift that cloak at
least in part by presenting and
analyzing what the Japanese
records reveal when
cross-referenced with Allied
sources.
It is
outside the scope of this
inquiry to describe the night
battle in detail, a task left to
a collaborative study to be
posted by this writer and Mr.
Allyn Nevitt at a future date.
The basic facts are well known.
On the late afternoon of 12
November 1942 a powerful
Japanese battle force from Truk
was closing Guadalcanal to
bombard the important Henderson
air field. This airfield, begun
by the Japanese, and finished by
the Americans upon landing at
Guadalcanal in August, was
judged to be key to the
continued survival of the
beachhead.
The
bombardment was but one
component of a massive Japanese
effort which planned to
reinforceGuadalcanal with troops
of the 38th Division from eleven
transports scheduled to make
landfall before midnight14
November. Before this, a
preparatory bombardment of
American positions around the
airfieldwas to take place in the
early hours of the 13th. Still
another Japanese force,
composedof the carrier JUNYO and
its escorts, would provide air
cover from a holding position
north of Malaita Island.
Henderson Field and its plucky
fliers known as the "Cactus Air
Force" had already survived
earlier bombings and
bombardments, particularly that
by KONGO and HARUNA prior, but
none as determined in scale as
this one. This time the Japanese
had with them two battleships,
the HIEI and KIRISHIMA, light
cruiser NAGARA flying the flag
of ComdesRon 10 Rear Admiral
Kimura Susumu, and no less than
sixteen destroyers. Vice Admiral
Abe Hiroaki, Commander
Battleship Division 11, was in
overall command of the task
force, designated the "Vanguard
Force of the Advance Force", and
carried his flag aboard HIEI.
The HIEI and KIRISHIMA were both
battleships of the KONGO class,
and though less heavily armored
than the NAGATOs or YAMATOs,
were wellsuited for such
assignments with their high
speed and 14-inch guns. HIEI in
particular was something of a
special ship, unique from her
sisters.This was because pre-war
she had been the chosen favorite
for Emperor Hirohito (Showa) to
view naval reviews of Combined
Fleet. Another reasonwas that
HIEI carried a more modern
superstructure than her sisters,
having been selected to test out
the new tower-mast design that
would bea distinctive feature of
the great YAMATO-class
battleships. All this served to
give HIEI a certain stature that
sweltering day as she steamed
throughsqualls toward Guadacanal.
As it
happened, the Americans were
also reinforcing the beachhead
at this time with two small
convoys, seeking to land 6,000
army personnel and
theirequipment. The reason was
that fleet intelligence had
decoded the plans for the
massive Japanese reinforcement.
But the warning had not come
soon enough. Though the
ENTERPRISE and the battleships
WASHINGTON and
SOUTH DAKOTA had put to
sea on 11 November, by the 12th
they were still 700 miles
southeast of Guadalcanal. Thus
the only available American
forces were the cruisers and
destroyers that had escorted the
two convoys. These had now all
rendezvoused and combined to
become oneforce, designated Task
Force 67.4 under Rear Admiral
D.J. Callaghan. His force of two
heavy cruisers(SAN FRANCISCO and
PORTLAND), three light
cruisers (ATLANTA,
JUNEAU, HELENA), and
eight destroyers were thus all
that were present to oppose VAdm
Abe's force. RAdm Callaghan flew
his flag on heavy cruiser
SAN FRANCISCO.
The
Japanese Advance group had
steamed south in the hot muggy
evening of 12 November in the
midst of a major squall which
cloaked andfollowed Abe's fleet
nearly all the way to Savo.
Though the Japanese were
grateful for the cover, there
was concern that the weather
might not lift in time for the
bombardment. As it was, the
squall caused the Advance Force
to become disorganized and its
formation disrupted. Many of
Abe's destroyers were no longer
in their proper positions when
at 0125, after having reversed
course for a time to clearthe
squall, Abe ordered incendiary
bombardment shells loaded and
came to course 140 to begin the
final run-in to Guadacanal.
Bombardment was now set to
commence at 0145, and in the
minutes that followed Batdiv 11
continuedto monitor reports of
the weather from Japanese
observers on shore, trying to
decide if the bombardment should
proceed. The night wasa pitch
black tropical dark, moonless,
and sweltering. Suddenly at 0142
came an alarming message from
YUDACHI: "Enemy Sighted!".
This
dismayed Abe, for no position
had been given, and if YUDACHI
was where she was supposed to be
(she was not and had pulled
ahead) it meant the enemy was
only 10,000 meters away. Seconds
later, HIEI's ownlookout sang
out confirmation---enemy ships,
5 degrees to starboard, distance
8,000 meters. Frantically the
Type-3incendiary shells were
ordered switched to
armor-piercing. A veritable
"stampede" in the magazines
resulted, for all knew that a
hit oneither battleship before
the highly explosive bombardment
shells were safely stowed could
turn them into infernos. But by
some providencethe Japanese did
not understand, Fortune gave
them eight long minutes
reprieve.
Admiral
Callaghan knew the Japanese were
coming, and at 0125 HELENA had
picked up a strong radar contact
18 miles distant and closing.
Seven minutes laterCallaghan
ordered course set north,
seeking to cross Abe's path and
thus "cap the T" - the famed and
coveted maneuver which allows
one to deployfull broadsides
against an opponent able only to
use their forward guns. This
should have given the Americans
the initiative, but Callaghan's
advantage was lost when a welter
of contradictory reports
confused him andYUDACHI and
HARUSAME suddenly plunged out of
the dark right across the head
of the American line, throwing
it into disarray. Ships turned
sharply to avoidcollision, while
at the same time wheeling guns
around to open fire. But this
state of affairs alarmed
Callaghan who refused to give
the order toopen fire despite
requests, for fear of hitting
his own ships. Thus, the very
moment YUDACHI sent warning to
Abe she was in the processof
putting the American line into
total chaos.
This
gave Abe the vital time he
needed to largely finish the
switch of his main battery
ammunition (though some
incendiary shells were reported
by the
U.S. Navy), and assess
the situation. Though confusion
persisted about the precise
location of the YUDACHI, the
Japanese, unlike the Americans,
could be sure the targets in
front ofthem were enemy. Six
minutes after sighting, Abe gave
the order to illuminate with
searchlights and to open fire.
The action began at 0148 (Local
time---Tokyo time was two hours
earlier) when HIEI in concert
with destroyer AKATSUKI
andothers snapped on
searchlights to illuminate
Callaghan's approaching force.
HIEI
unleashed a truly devastating
opening salvo, apparentlyhitting
ATLANTA at the outset.
Caught in the illumination, the
ATLANTA and the
SAN FRANCISCO behind were
all but sitting ducks,
spotlighted for all the Japanese
fleet to see. But they were far
from impotent, and were almost
at once returning fire with
equal gusto. Thus beganwhat
historian Paul Dull and others
have referred to as "the most
confused, close-ranged, and
horrendous surface engagement of
the war." It was alsosurreally
brief. In reading of the
detailed hard-fought action in
multi-paged accounts, it is both
startling and easy to overlook
noting the fact that the time
spanned from when HIEI and
AKATSUKI snapped on their
searchlights to the end of the
action was barely a half hour.
Both
ships paid a dire price for the
use of their searchlights. HIEI
and AKATSUKI were immediately
targeted by most of the
Americanline and hit by a deluge
of shells. The result left
AKATSUKI listing to port and
sinking by the stern; the much
stouter HIEI fared better, but
scoresof her crew were killed
outright as shells drilled into
her throughout her length. At
the same time, the
ATLANTA was smashed to
ruin, with Rear Admiral Norman
Scott dead on the bridge, but
the rest of the American line
hit HIEI at will.
On HIEI
almost all internal
communications were severed, and
fires broke outforward and
amidships. HIEI and KIRISHIMA
commenced a hard turn to port to
prevent Callaghan from "crossing
the T" but before this could be
accomplished each American
destroyer dashed by HIEI at
truly point-blank range, pouring
a hailstorm of gunfire into the
towering superstructureof the
Japanese battlewagon looming
over them. Shrapnel shattered
the bridge windows, and cut down
many of the officers gathered
there, includingCaptain Suzuki
Masakane, Abe's Chief of Staff.
In addition HIEI's skipper,
Captain Nishida Masao,
Vice-Admiral Abe himself, and
staff officer ChihayaMastaka
were also wounded, adding to the
sense of confusion.
Despite
all this, the HIEI certainly
gave as good as she got. Finding
SAN FRANCISCO only 2,500
yards away she turned left and
the two flagships passed each
other on opposite courses, main
guns thundering. As she swung to
port her guns bracketed
SAN FRANCISCO at
point-blank range, largely
perforating the superstructure.
Rear Admiral Callaghan and three
of his staff were killed and
Captain Cassin Young mortally
wounded when the bridge was
shattered by both Japanese and
Americanshells, and the
SAN FRANCISCO staggered
out of formation and out of the
fight. Before she did so, she or
a comrade struck a most
fatefuland crucial blow. At
approximately 0154 two large
shells, probably from the
SAN FRANCISCO, struck
HIEI on the starboard quarter
and punched a 2-meter hole in
the shell. As a result, water
began to enter the steering gear
room under the pressure of her
battle speed. The water shorted
outthe generators, and HIEI
suddenly lost power steering.
The
giant was now careering widely
over the sea, but Captain
Nishida quickly switched to
manual steering. The brave
steering gear crew stayed at
their posts in the steadily
rising water, holding the rudder
centered while HIEI used her
engines to keep course. This
task was made even more
difficult by the cutting of all
communication other than
onecritical line from the bridge
to the engine room. With fires
lighting her pagoda like lamps
and flames rising higher than
the stacks, HIEI completed her
nearly 180 degree turn and began
to head northward at reduced
speed,leaving the battlefield
astern where Japanese and
American ships still dueled with
one another.
At 0200
as a result of the damage to his
flagship and possibly distracted
by his wound and the sheer
ferocity of the American
gunfire, Admiral Abe quickly
lost heart and canceled the
bombardment. Convinced hewas
facing a superior force he
ordered a general withdrawal to
the north of Savo. The HIEI
continued to steer with her
engines making about 10 knots
while damage reports were
assessed. While itis arguable
that sister battleship KIRISHIMA
should have stayed close by to
lend assistance and cover, she
did no such thing. Instead,
despitehaving received only one
8 inch shell on the
quarter-deck, KIRISHIMA was
ordered north by Abe out of the
battle zone at high speed. She
proceeded north, passing east of
Savo, while HIEI crawled around
to the west of Savo. HIEI
wouldhave to cope with her
damage as best she could with
the assistance of light cruiser
NAGARA which remained close-by.
The
damage was severe, but
manageable. Fires burned in
several levels of the bridge
pagoda, and the main guns were
out of action due to a
disruption in theelectrical
circuits. Further, the secondary
battery was also crippled by the
destruction of its control
tower; on the other hand,
despite approximately50 large
and 85 smaller caliber shell
hits, there was apparently
little underwater damage and not
much water apart from the
steering room entering the hull.
(However, sincethe ranges the
battle was fought at were so
close, it is likely that HIEI's
armor was penetrated in several
cases, and there is possibility
that flooded boiler
roomsmentioned later were
products of earlier damage).
Thus theHIEI could be saved if
she could get far enough away by
dawn which would bring certain
air attacks from Henderson Field
and the ENTERPRISE.
For
four hours the HIEI continued to
bulldoze painfully north, but at
0600 as sunrise lighted the
battlefield the steady flooding
forced the stubborn men to
abandon the manual-steering
compartment. The abandonment
allowed the battleship's rudder
to swing hard over to the right,
jamming HIEI in a wide
starboardturn so that "she
circled almost in the same
spot". This was a ominous turn
for the worse, and HIEI's plight
was now very serious. As a
result, Admiral Kimura ordered
the destroyer TERUZUKI and
Desdiv 27 to join HIEI, and the
YUKIKAZE was already en-route.
Almost as if seeking relief from
his frustration, at 0607 Captain
Nishida ordered HIEI's aft
turretsto train out and open
fire on a drifting enemy
derelict visible 13 miles to the
south. This was the crippled
AARON WARD, and again and again
HIEI sent 2-gun salvoes
whistling down the gap withgusto.
The third salvo was a straddle,
but just as the AARON WARD
appeared doomed, Marine Corps
aircraft appeared and commenced
the first of a day-long series
of air attacks. HIEI got off
only one more salvo at AARON
WARD before she had to turn her
attention to the threat from the
air. Her last opportunity to
strike a blow at theenemy had
passed, and a grateful AARON
WARD was soon towed away to
Tulagi.
The
attacking planes were five
VMSB-142 SBDs and four VMSB-131
TBFs from Henderson Field. They
claimed one bomb and one torpedo
hit, but no torpedo hitseems to
have scored. As these aircraft
flew away, at 0620 the YUKIKAZE
arrived. YUKIKAZE was flagship
of Shoji Kiichio, Comdesdiv 16,
and Admiral Kimura turned over
the protection of HIEI to
Captain Shoji, and took NAGARA
north to rejoin KIRISHIMA. At
0800 more reinforcements showed
up as TERUZUKI, SHIGURE,
SHIRATSUYU, and YUGURE arrived.
With their arrival Abe now
resolved to transfer his flag
sinceHIEI was reduced to only
hand semaphore to signal and
incapable as serving as a
flagship of any kind. At 0815
RAdm Abe forsook the HIEI (Staff
Officer Chihaya Masataka gives a
gripping account of how fires
made escape fromthe damaged
pagoda difficult) and ran his
flag up on the destroyer
YUKIKAZE. However, just at that
timea flight of three B-17s
arrived overhead making a bomb
run from 14,000 feet.
Captain
Nishida had stopped to allow
pumping of the steering room,
but now had to get HIEI back
underway, quickly building up
speed to 15 knots as he sought
to evade the bombs coming down.
Trailing a large slick to
starboard,the HIEI commenced a
wide sweeping turn to the right,
and managed to avoid all but one
direct 500 hit by a 500-pound
bomb. The damage was minimal,
but had caused the re-flooding
of the steering room by forcing
HIEI to get underway. The
battleship's need for a tow was
growing more likely, and at
0930the KIRISHIMA reversed
course under orders to proceed
back to the rescue of the HIEI.
However, in the northern part of
Indispensable Strait she
wassupposedly attacked by
submarine which hit her with two
dud torpedoes. Though no damage
was done, it was enough to abort
the rescue, and KIRISHIMA once
moreresumed her flight.
Meanwhile the HIEI had
successfully weathered another
series of attacks by seven SBDs,
but though they did no damage, a
second effort by theVMSB-131's
TBFs at 1010 followed five
minutes later by nine TBFs from
the ENTERPRISE attacked and
claimed one torpedo hit on the
bow. If so, the damage was
slight, but these first air
attacks had been quite enough to
shatter any confidence Abe had
of saving the HIEI. At Midway he
had seenthe power of airpower
devastate Kido Butai, and known
for caution, was inclined to
vacate the area at once. At 1020
he ordered the battleship's
skipper to beach her on
Guadalcanal. However, Captain
Nishida Masao's nerve and
perseverance proved to be
muchgreater. He flatly refused
to obey the order, protesting
that the HIEI was not mortally
damaged, certainly not sinking,
and could still be saved. Abe
yielded.
But the
Americans were not about to
permit such salvage efforts go
unhindered. At 1110 fourteen
more B-17s dropped bombs,
claiming one hit, followedin the
hour after by six SBDs which
claimed three bomb hits. At 1210
came six more TBFs, from the
ENTERPRISE and Henderson Field
which claimed one `certain'
andone likely torpedo hit. Their
attack runs were conducted in
the face of the awesome blast of
HIEI's main guns, as the
battleship tried to swat them
out of the sky with
her14-inchers. Whatever the
damage, it was not enough to
dissuade the gallant Captain
Nishida to abandon, despite
another order by Abe at 1235
instructing that the crew should
be removed duringthe next lull
in air attacks. An hour later,
Nishida's efforts received a
much needed boost when six or
more Zeroes from carrier
JUNYOarrived at last overhead
and increasing cloud cover
frustrated further attacks. By
this time, according to the
Diary of Admiral Ugaki, HIEI had
suffered serious damage to the
upper deckand three of her eight
boilers were unusable, whether
due to air attack damage or
gunfire is not clear.
Nevertheless, as the afternoon
wore on, hopes steadily rose.
HIEI was not settling any
further, her engines remained
useable, and sunsetwould bring
the cloak of darkness, perhaps
even tow, and escape. If the use
of the rudder could be restored,
she could proceed on her own
power. Sureenough, divers sent
down to pump out the steering
room reported that their efforts
were succeeding, and within an
hour were about 70% complete. By
1430, even Abe was hopeful. He
logged that "manual steering had
been made possible, thethe fire
at the foremast had been placed
under control, and the pumping
out of the steering room was
succeeding". It lookedas if
Captain Nishida's faith was to
be rewarded.
These
hopes were dashed by "12 carrier
torpedo planes" which suddenly
just then appeared and swept in
to the attack. Actually they
were sixtorpedo planes, all from
ENTERPRISE, but they may as well
have been twelve. They claimed
two hits scored, and this time
claims were not exaggerated. The
Japanese records statethat at
1435 two torpedoes hit the
HIEI's starboard side amidships
and at the stern. The former
flooded the starboard engine
room, but it was the hit at the
stern that was the real
heartbreaker for the Japanese.
From the proximity of the hit,
and the fact that HIEIhad to get
back underway to avoid attack,
water now re-entered the
steering room with numbing
force. All the hard-won gainsof
the past hours were nullified,
and HIEI remained unnavigable.
By 1530
HIEI was visibly listing to
starboard and down at the stern.
Rear Admiral Abe had had enough.
He penned a writtenorder to
Captain Nishida to abandon, and
sent it over in a cutter. Grim
faced, close to tears, Captain
Nishida crushed the paper inhis
hand. He still procrastinated,
but not long after he received
an erroneous report that the
final engines had flooded. True
or not, itwas finally enough.
Bowing reluctantly to the
inevitable, Captain Nishida gave
the order to abandon ship. The
evacuation of the nearly 1,300
men proceeded in an orderly
dignified fashion, with Nishida
directing the process from a
chair atop the No. 3 turret. As
the abandonment continued and
destroyers moved close
alongside, the last of nine SBDs
launched their attack, but
Captain Nishida
stoicallyremained at his perch
as bullets spattered around and
bombs detonated alongside. No
damage or losses resulted
however.
As 1800
and sunset both drew on, the
laborious task of removing
HIEI's huge crew was at last
completed. Even Captain Nishida
hadbeen forcibly removed and
hauled reluctantly from his
turret perch to safety at Abe's
command. With the battleship's
stubborn skipperat last out of
the way, Abe was able to proceed
with the unseemly business of
sinking the wounded queen by his
own hand. He orderedCaptain
Setoyama Yasuhide of Desdiv 27
in the soon-to-be famous SHIGURE
to do the job with torpedoes,
but at 1838 appeared a final
roadblock to his determination.
A signal arrived from
CombinedFleet, from Admiral
Yamamoto no less, ordering that
Abe "not do so". The HIEI was
not to be sunk by Japanese
hands, Yamamoto instructed, but
left afloat to perform the final
service of drawing American fire
away from the approaching
transports and the
secondreformed bombardment group
led by her sister, KIRISHIMA.
There is some question as to
whether the seacocks had already
beenopened, or even torpedoes
fired, but in any case, Abe
suspended the scuttling
forthwith. (His insistence on
scuttling clearly
irritatedYamamoto, for he
immediately relieved him of all
further command.)
With
that, a doubtless vexed and
frustrated Abe could do nothing
but circle the HIEI wearily. At
1900 he ceased to do even
thatand took his five destroyers
out of sight to the west so as
not to cause confusion among
Admiral Mikawa's incoming
cruisers. The HIEI, forlorn
andabandoned, was left behind in
the gathering darkness alone.
When last seen, she was listing
15 degrees to starboard, and the
quarter-deck was nearly awash.
No one ever saw her again. When
Abe in YUKIKAZE finally returned
with the others at 0100 14
November,the stricken battleship
was nowhere to be found. He
searched for half-an hour more,
but still nothing. Sometime in
the six long hoursbetween 1900
and 0100 the HIEI had gone with
188 of her company to her final
resting place at the floor of "Ironbottom
Sound". She was the first
Japanese battleshiplost in
World War II and the
first sunk by the
U.S. Navy since 1898.
As it
transpired, sister ship
KIRISHIMA had earned only a
day's lease on life. Returning
on the night of the 14th to
attempt the bombardment again to
cover Tanaka's
transports----just before
midnight she was ambushed and
reduced to a sinkingwreck in a
furious gunfire duel with the
battleships
WASHINGTON and
SOUTH DAKOTA. Like sister
HIEI before her, KIRISHIMA
rolled over and sank in the
waters west of Savo Island.
This
then is the last battle of the
HIEI as seen from Japanese
records. These indicate that the
battleship WAS NOT a `total
loss' oreven mortally wounded by
the night action, though some
shells clearly penetrated her
armor and may have knocked out
some boilers . Then, what of the
larger question? Which, agent -
surface gunfire or air attack -
should take "credit" for the
sinking? The answer is clear, if
likely unsatisfying. The truth
is that gunfire and air attack
must share the credit for
forcing theJapanese to make the
final disposal; whether by
seacocks or torpedoes as the
case may be. The gunfire -
especially the two shell hits
that tore open and flooded the
steering room - directly
initiated the events that lead
to HIEI's loss by robbing her of
the maneuverability that would
have allowed her to escape.
However, the battleship's
watertight integrity and
powerwas not severely affected,
and left unscathed, the HIEI
could probably have joined up or
received a tow from the
incomingAdvance Force or others.
The air attacks removed this
possibility by negating Captain
Nishida and his crew's heroic
salvageefforts.
However, another question is
invariably raised. Was HIEI
mortally wounded after BOTH
gunfire and air attacks were
completed, and wasthe Japanese
scuttling action redundant? This
has the potential to cause
debate similar to that
engendered about the BISMARCK's
scuttling.Nonetheless, given the
subsequent behavior following
underwater damage of sister
battleship KIRISHIMA it appears
quite likely that thescuttling
WAS redundant. Indeed, there is
some question of whether it took
place before Yamamoto's
countermand. In any case with as
manyas three or more torpedo
hits HIEI was already listing
increasingly and progressive
flooding spreading. KIRISHIMA
ultimately would founder without
scuttling, and in
thishistorian's opinion the HIEI
would have as well.
One
final mystery defies solution.
Where did HIEI sink? The Ballard
underwater search failed to
locate the battleship's wreck.
Or did they? The capsized hull
of the Kongo-class battleship
found was in truth, never
definitively identified. A
magazine explosion had
demolishedthe forepart, but no
marked other damage was
discerned. Except one. The
extreme fantail of the wreck was
severed and broken. Couldthis be
a result of HIEI's stern torpedo
damage? Is this in fact, the
HIEI, and not the KIRISHIMA as
usually assumed? At present it
is impossible toanswer this
question. KIRISHIMA's Action
Report states that she capsized
and sank in a position bearing
265 degrees, 11 miles from Savo
Island's summit. Ugaki's diary
entry the day prior gives the
same reference point, but states
the bearing as 285 degrees, 8
miles.(09-05'S, 159-42'E). Thus,
the onlyclear indication is that
the KIRISHIMA sank at a point
something like due west 8-11
miles from the summit of Savo
Island. For HIEI, S.E. Morison
gives a position 5 miles NNW of
Savo Island. The last precisely
reported position of the HIEI
was "drifting in an area bearing
347 degrees, distance 4.6 miles
from Savo Island". Since this
was at 1305 hours, is it
possible that drift might
havebrought her close to the
1992 wreck site? Perhaps,
perhaps not. Unfortunately, this
is a question only further
search can answer. However,
given that the August 1992
battleship wreck was reportedly
only a mile from the supposed
sinking site, and some reports
mention an undersea detonation
after she sank, odds are that it
is indeed the KIRISHIMA.
Any
correspondence from readers with
knowledge about the questions
raised or wishing to engage in
commentary and discussion would
be welcome.
